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I. INTRODUCTION
Since King Solomon was called upon to render the first reported child

custody decision,' courts have struggled with the conflicting interests and
emotions involved in custody disputes.2

[Aipproximately one American in five changes residences each year.

Economic necessity and remarriage account for the bulk of relocations.
*
Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1. 1 Kings 3:25, 28 (King James) ("And the. king said, Divide the living child in
two, and give half to one, and half to the other .... And all Israel heard of the judgment
which the king had judged; and ... they saw that the wisdom of God was in him, to do
judgment.").
2.
Russenberger v. Russenberger, 654 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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Because of the ordinary needs for both parents after a marital dissolution
to secure or retain employment, pursue educational or career opportunities, or reside in the same location as a new spouse or other family or
friends, it is unrealistic to assume that divorced parents will permanently
remain in the same location after dissolution or to exert pressure on them
to do so. It would also undermine the interest in minimizing costly litigation over custody and require the trial courts to "micromanage" family
decision making by3 second-guessing reasonsfor every day decisions about
careerandfamily.
Within four years of a divorce, one-fourth of all custodialmothers will
move to a new location.4
To overcome the presumption in favor of relocation, "the party opposing the removal must offer evidence which would establish that the removal
of the child and would endanger the child's
is not in the best interests
5
health and well-being."
The primary purpose of this article is to suggest a binuclear familycentered approach to resolving custody relocation disputes. Before discussing the particulars of the binuclear family-centered approach, the article
provides a general overview of the various conflicting relocation standards
that have been generated by legislatures, discussed and developed by
6
learned academic groups, and applied by courts to these disputes. There is
extensive critical discussion of the endangerment standard-a standard
adopted by some jurisdictions where one parent has been designated as the
primary or sole custodial parent and that parent seeks to relocate. The article argues that the use of the endangerment standard is outmoded, emphasizes a winner-loser mentality, may be perceived by some as unfair to the
noncustodial parent, and fails to adequately protect the best interests of a
minor child.
The article argues that the legal system should move toward a binuclear family-centered process in relocation disputes that removes, or at least
3. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480-81 (Cal. 1996).
Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 222 (N.J. 2001) (citing Chris Ford, Untying the
4.
Relocation Knot: Recent Development and a Model for Change, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,
7 (1997)).
5. Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996).
See also Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision6.
Making-How Judges Use the Primary CaretakerStandard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 13-32 (1998) (describing the evolution of AngloAmerican jurisprudence since the Seventeenth Century).
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lessens, the perception that one of the parents is a winner and the other a
loser. A binuclear family is defined as a large, interconnected family, with
one household headed by the ex-wife and the other household headed by
the ex-husband, with the child being a member of both.
The article also argues that a child's biological parents should be provided three opportunities to settle a relocation dispute with the primary responsibility placed on them; not a court. The suggested settlement plan
encourages timely attention and movement toward resolution of the dispute
with the first two settlement stages occurring within thirty days of a relocation notice by either party.
The initial stage to resolve a relocation dispute involves a mandated
parenting plan meeting between the parents. This meeting occurs after either parent has given notice of an intention to relocate and upon the request
of the adverse party. If the parties certify that after making reasonable attempts that they have failed to produce a parenting plan, they move to the
second stage, which is mandated mediation with a family law mediator.
Should mediation also fail, and the parties certify this fact to the trial court,
the parties move to the final stage of the settlement process where a date is
set for a de novo hearing. Prior to the de novo hearing, the court may sua
sponte appoint a guardian ad litem and possibly order separate counsel for
the child or children involved with the parties sharing in the expenses. The
court may also sua sponte order the parties to undergo psychiatric and other
tests and share in these expenses.
At the de novo hearing, both parties are allowed to submit evidence
regarding the impact the proposed relocation will have on the minor child.
The party who persuades a court by a preponderance of evidence that the
proposed relocation is, or is not, in the child's best interest, prevails. All
parties are, of course, subject to sanctions as provided by local rules of civil
procedure. A finding that a move is not in the child's best interest does not
automatically result in a change in custody unless the custodial or primary
parent continues with the plan to relocate.
There are several interwoven themes contained in this article. First,
the continued proliferation of a variety of often changing relocation models
challenges the law's ability to achieve a reasonable level of predictability
and certainty in outcomes.7 Second, relocation disputes are among the most

7.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.17, cmt. d (2002); see

also Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). "[O]ur research has failed
to reveal a consistent, universally accepted approach to the question of when a custodial
parent may relocate out-of-state over the objection of the non-custodial parent. In fact, the
opposite is true. Across the country, applicable standards remain distressingly disparate."
Gruber, 583 A.2d at 437.
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volatile and challenging legal matters coming to a family court.8 Third, the
"new family" theory advanced by many courts and scholars over the past
three decades should be replaced with the binuclear family as there is little
support for continuing the charade that when sole physical custody is
awarded to one parent, or a primary parent is designated, that the "new family" consists of the custodial parent and child. In fact, divorce creates a
"binuclear family" made up of larger, interconnected families, with one
household headed by the custodial parent and the other household headed
by the noncustodial parent, with the child being a member of both.
Another theme is the frustration with social scientists who are unable
to provide reliable research data explaining the impact relocation has on
children; data upon which statutory relocation tools can be dependably
forged. Because of the uncertain nature of the present social science data,
relocation decisions and standards created by state legislatures appear to be
the product of politicians, think tanks, or besieged judges, whose decisions
in this area may be affected by many factors, some of which may not necessarily be relevant to the best interests of a child.
This article challenges the relocation approach advanced by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference)
as outmoded and fostering a winner-loser mentality rather than effective
resolution of relocation disputes. The Commissioners' report, published in
the early 1970s and labeled the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA), is responsible, at least in part, for the continued acceptance of the
family" theory, and application of these
endangerment principle, the "new
9
disputes.
relocation
to
concepts
It is noted that numerous legal scholars have written about a variety of
approaches that courts should consider when resolving relocation disputes.' 0 For the most part, those efforts have concentrated upon determin8. See Tropea v. Tropea, 642 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (N.Y. 1966). "Relocation cases
such as the two before us present some of the knottiest and most disturbing problems that
our courts are called upon to resolve." Id.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159 (1990).
9.
See, e.g., William G. Austin, Relocation Law and the Threshold of Harm; Inte10.
grating Legal and Behavioral Perspectives,34 FAM. L.Q. 63 (2000); Janet M. Bowermaster,
Sympathizing With Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791 (1992); Carol S. Bruch and Janet Bowermeister, The Relocation
of Children and Custodial Parents:Public Policy, Pastand Present, 30 FAM. L. 245 (1996);
Christopher P. Carrington, Note, Family Law-Relocation Disputes-From Parent to Paycheck: The Demotion of the Noncustodial Parent with the Creationof the Custodial Parent's
Presumptive Right to Relocate, Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 615 (Spring 2004); Caroline Ritchie Heil, Relocation Cases as Change in Custody
Proceedings, "Judicial Blackmail" or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 885
(2000); Judge Thomas A. James, Jr., Custody Relocation Law in Pennsylvania: Time to
Revisit and Revise Gruber v. Gruber, 107 DICK. L. REV. 45 (2002); Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.,
Family Interests in Competition: Relocation and Visitation, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 31
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ing the selection of a winner or loser through the application of presumptions, acceptance of questionable social science, and/or placing the burden
of proof on one of the warring parties.
II.

VARIOUS RELOCATION STANDARDS

Jurisdictions throughout the United States vary in their selection of a
legal standard to apply to resolve a relocation dispute-there is no general
agreement on the superior standard. Some jurisdictions favor the custodial
parent, others the noncustodial parent, and a few take a fairly neutral approach that favors neither parent. Which of the warring parents is favored
usually turns on the existence of a presumption and/or a direct allocation of
the burden of proof. For example, Arizona and South Carolina have used a
presumption favoring the nonrelocating parent by placing the burden of
proof justifying the relocation primarily on the custodial parent." However, jurisdictions such as Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin,
2
Arkansas, and others use presumptions favoring the custodial parent.'
Some of these latter jurisdictions place the initial burden of proof on the
noncustodial parent to demonstrate that relocation will place the minor
child in real danger-an extremely high burden to meet.
(2002); Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 34
U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1995); Steven Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach to
Custodial Parent Move-Away Cases, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 498 (1998); Lucy S.
McGough, Starting Over: The Heuristics of Family Relocation Decision Making, 77 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 291 (2003); Robert Oliphant, Minnesota's Custody Relocation Doctrine: Is
There a Need for Change?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 723 (2001); Janet Leach Richards,
Children's Rights v. Parent'sRights: A Proposed Solution to the CustodialRelocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. REV. 245 (1999); Tabitha Sample and Teresa Reiger, Relocation Standards and Constitutional Considerations, 10 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 229 (1998); Edward
Sivin, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implicationsfor Right to Travel, 12
RUTGERS L.J. 341 (1981); Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation: Moving Forward or Moving
Backward, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 983 (2000); Judith S. Wallerstein and Tony J. Tanke, To
Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. Q. 305 (1996).
11.
See, e.g., Pollock v. Pollock, 889 P.2d 633, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); McAIister v. Patterson, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 1982).
12.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2002) (creating a presumption that courts
will retain the existing primary placement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 19 (West 1998)
(promulgating that in absence of a showing of prejudice to the rights or welfare of a child, a
custodial parent has a presumptive right to change their child's residence); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.327(3)(a)2.a (West 2001) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that continuing the
current custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child); Hollandsworth v.
Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Ark. 2003); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473,478
(Cal. 1996); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 303 (N.M. 1991) (affirming the rebuttable
presumption that relocation with custodial parent is in best interest of the child). See also
Kathryn E. Abare, Protecting the New Family: Ireland v. Ireland and Connecticut's Custodial ParentRelocation Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 307 (1999).
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Jurisdictions such as Connecticut and New Jersey have adopted a burden-shifting approach that initially places the burden upon the relocating
parent to make a prima facie showing of a legitimate or good faith reason
for the move.' 3 For example, in Ireland v. Ireland,4 the Connecticut court
ruled that the custodial parent seeking relocation bears the initial burden of
demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the relocation is
for a legitimate purpose, and (2) the proposed location is reasonable in light
of that purpose. The noncustodial parent then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the relocation would not be in the best interest of
the child. This approach is similar to that adopted by New York in Tropea
v. Tropea.15 The Connecticut court in Ireland cautioned that while the
guiding principle is the best interest and welfare of the child, "'[N]o single
factor should be treated as dispositive or given such disproportionate weight
as to predetermine the outcome."",16 The factors a Connecticut court may
consider in a relocation dispute include the following:
[1.] Each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the
move;
[2.] The quality of the relationships between the child and
the custodial and noncustodial parents;
[3.] The impact of the move on the quantity and quality of
the child's future contact with the noncustodial parent;
[4.] The degree to which the custodial parent's and child's
life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the move;
[5.] The feasibility of preserving the relationship between
the noncustodial parent and the child through suitable visitation arrangements; and
[6.] The negative impact, if any, from continued or exacerbated hostility between the custodial and noncustodial parents.

See, e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 230-31 (N.J. 2001).
13.
717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998).
14.
642 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. 1996). Prior to this decision, New York used a reloca15.
tion formula that required that a custodial parent show "exceptional circumstances" to overcome the presumption against removal.
Ireland,717 A.2d at 685 (quoting Tropea, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 580).
16.
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The Connecticut list is not exhaustive and other similar considerations
are found in other jurisdictions. For example, Pennsylvania lists the following items as relevant when arriving at a relocation decision:
(1) the potential advantages of the proposed move, economic or otherwise, and the likelihood the move would improve substantially the quality of life for the custodial parent and the children and is not the result of a monetary [sic]
whim on the part of the custodial parent;
(2) the integrity of the motives of both the custodial and
noncustodial parent in seeking the move or seeking to prevent it; and
(3) the availability of realistic, substitute visitation arrangements which will adequately foster an ongoing relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. 17
Another jurisdiction, Florida, considers the following factors in a relocation dispute:
(1) whether the move would be likely to improve the general quality of life for both the residential parent and the
child;
(2) the extent to which visitation rights have been allowed
and exercised;
(3) whether the primary residential parent, once out of the
jurisdiction, will be likely to comply with any substitute
visitation arrangements;
(4) whether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster a continuing meaningful relationship between the child
and the secondary residential parent;
(5) whether the cost of transportation is financially affordable by one or both parties; and
18
(6) whether the move is in the best interests of the child.

If one were to combine the above factors from these and other jurisdictions into a single list, it would be impressive. Should a relocation dispute
17.

18.

Gancas v. Schultz, 683 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
FLA. STAT.

ch. 61.13(2)(d) (1997).
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reach the de novo stage of the process outlined in this article, the list could
prove helpful to judges when faced with resolving the matter.
Jurisdictions also find themselves in disagreement over whether a
planned move by the custodial parent constitutes "changed circumstances"
sufficient to trigger reconsideration of custody under existing custody
modification statutes. The question is whether relocation constitutes a substantial change in circumstances that warrants a hearing.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taylor 19 held that a custodial parent's proposed move did not automatically justify reexamination of
the existing custody decree. However, other jurisdictions have treated the
decision to relocate as constituting changed circumstances that justifies
reexamination of the dispute.2 ° Some courts take a middle ground such as
that followed by California in LaMusga v. LaMusga.2' In that case, the
court ruled that relocation is not per se a change in circumstances, however,
under certain circumstances the court felt it may be treated as triggering the
modification statute. A handful of jurisdictions have also enacted specific
mileage restrictions that require notice when the limit in the statute is exceeded.22
This is an area of the law where confusion, uncertainty and anger are
found in abundance. It cries out for new, innovative, and uniform treatment.
III. UMDA AND ENDANGERMENT
The most serious obstacle to the development of a binuclear, familycentered approach to resolving relocation disputes suggested by this article
is the use in some jurisdictions of the endangerment standard. In those jurisdictions, a hearing on a proposed relocation request is not ordered absent
a showing by the noncustodial parent that the change will seriously endanger the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm
19.
20.

849 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1993). See also Pitt v. Olds, 511 S.E.2d 60 (S.C. 1999).
See, e.g., Rowland v. Kingman, 629 A.2d 613 (Me. 1993); Domingues v. John-

son, 593 A.2d 1133 (Md. 1991); Rice v. Shepard, 877 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).
21.

See, e.g., Hoos v. Hoos, 562 N.E.2d 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Brown v.
22.
Loveman, 680 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing MICH. COMP. LAWS §722.31,
a statute setting forth factors a trial court should consider before permitting a legal residence
change of more than one hundred miles); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (2001).
If a parent who is spending intervals of time with a child desires to relocate outside the state or more than one hundred (100) miles from the
other parent within the state, the relocating parent shall send a notice to
the other parent at the other parent's last known address by registered or
certified mail.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (2001).
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likely to be caused by a change of environment outweighs its advantages.
Absent the hearing, the custodial or primary parent is free to relocate with
the minor child.
The genesis of the endangerment standard is found in the UMDA,
which was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (Conference). The Conference is an influential national organization promoting law reform.2 3 It consists of more than 300
commissioners from throughout the United States, all of whom are stateappointed, serve without pay, and are selected within each state from
groups of lawyers, legislators, judges and academics.2 4
In 1970 the Conference released its initial version of a model family
law act-UMDA-and during the following three years it was amended
twice. 25 It is reported that each policy of the UMDA-"indeed, each clause
of each section-was the subject of intense, often cantankerous debate"
among the Commissioners on the drafting committee, "between Advisors
and Commissioners, often between Commissioners and Reporters., 26 Furthermore, every provision was the product either of a compromise among
competing policy choices or a vote to which there was significant dissent.21
Only selected sections of the Uniform Act were adopted in some jurisdictions, and eight states adopted its main dissolution principles more or
less intact. 28 The Act was initially criticized by some scholars for its lack of
feminist consideration, at least in areas such as no fault divorce and rejection of the maternal presumption in custody disputes.29
The Commissioners, reflecting the cultural values of the 1960s and using what sparse social science was available, created a standard that placed
an extraordinarily high burden on a noncustodial parent challenging a relocation request by inserting the word "endangerment" into the relocation

23.

See Lawrence J. Bugge, Symposium: One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws

Tribute, William J. Pierce,89 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1991).
24.
Id.
25.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 10 1-506, 9A U.L.A. (1998).

26.
Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-and Some Reflections About its Critics and its Policies, 1991 BYU L. REV. 43, 43

(1991).
27.
Id.
28.
The states adopting the Act essentially intact are: Arizona - ARIz. REV. STAT. §
25-311 to 25-330, 25-401 to 25-411; Colorado - Parts I and II, COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-101
to 14-2-113 1Parts III and IV, COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-101 to 14-10-133; Illinois - 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101 to 5/802; Kentucky - Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.010 to 403.350;
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.002 to 518.66 ; Missouri - Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.300
to 452.416; Montana - MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-101 to 40-1-404, 40-4-101 to 40-4-226;
Washington - WASH. REV. CODE §26.09.
29.
Levy, supra note 26, at 48-50.
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section of the model act. The operative language is found in section 409(b)
of the UMDA and reads as follows:
[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless
it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the
prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time
of the entry of the prior decree, that a change has occurred
in the circumstances of the child or his custodian, and that
the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of
the child.
In applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the prior decree unless: ...(3)
the child's present environment endangers seriously his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the harm
likely to be caused by a change30 of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him.
The endangerment language represented a "significant departure from
the other standards of custody modification" existing at the time in the
United States. 31 It is believed that the Commissioners created the endangerment barrier because they thought that a "child's interest in continuity
make ensuring the finality of a custody decree more important than determining which parent is the more fit custodian. 32 The Commissioners also
thought that "shuffling" a child between warring parents was emotionally
damaging to the child.33 They reasoned that because the best interests of
30.

UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409(b), 9A U.L.A. 439 (1998).

The Act

also states that "[a]ttomey fees and costs shall be assessed against a party seeking modification if the court finds that the modification action is vexatious and constitutes harassment."
Id. at § 409(c).
31.
Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94
YALE L.J. 757, 775 (1985). See LaFrance, supra note 10.
32.
Id. at 774.
33.
The Commentary to section 409 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
states:
Most experts who have spoken to the problems of post-divorce adjustment of children believe that insuring the decree's finality is more important than determining which parent should be the custodian. See
Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following

Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969). This section is designed to
maximize finality (and thus assure continuity for the child) without jeopardizing the child's interest. Because any emergency which poses an
immediate threat to the child's physical safety usually can be handled by
the juvenile court, subsection (a) prohibits modification petitions until at
least two years have passed following the initial decree, with a "safety
valve" for emergency situations. To discourage the noncustodial parent
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the child "have already resulted in an award of custody to a particular parent, ....
itfollows that the child should live wherever that residence may be
rather than
in what is by definition the less important location of the other
34
parent.

Section 409 of the UMDA assumes that a modification is not in a
child's best interests unless the change seriously endangers the child's
physical, mental, moral or emotional health.35 The Commissioners also
discouraged subsequent custody modification actions by placing time barriers that limited when such actions could be heard. For example, absent a
showing of endangerment, section 409 bars a change of custody hearing for
two years following an initial custody decision.36
Section 409(c) of the UMDA further promotes the commissioners'
view of stability by mandating the assessment of attorney's fees against the
noncustodial parent for harassment litigation. It was thought that assesswho tries to punish a former spouse by frequent motions to modify, the
subsection includes a two-year waiting period following each modification decree. During that two-year period a contestant can get a hearing
only if he can make an initial showing, by affidavit only, that there is
some greater urgency for the change than that the child's "best interest"
requires it. During the two-year period the judge should deny a motion
to modify, without a hearing, unless the moving party carries the onerous burden of showing that the child's present environment may endanger his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. Subsection (b) in
effect asserts a presumption that the present custodian is entitled to continue as the child's custodian. It does authorize modifications which
serve the child's "best interest;" but this standard is to be applied under
the principle that modification should be made only in three situations:
where the custodian agrees to the change; where the child, although formally in the custody of one parent, has in fact been integrated into the
family of the petitioning parent (to avoid encouraging noncustodial kidnapping, this ground requires the consent of the custodial parent); or
where the noncustodial parent can prove both that the child's present environment is dangerous to physical, mental, moral, or emotional health
and that the risks of harm from change of environment are outweighed
by the advantage of such a change to the child. The last phrase of subsection (b)(3) is especially important because it compels attention to the
real issue in modification cases. Any change in the child's environment
may have an adverse effect, even if the noncustodial parent would better
serve the child's interest. Subsection (b)(3) focuses the issue clearly and
demands the presentation of evidence relevant to the resolution of that
issue. Subsection (c) provides an additional sanction against vexatious
and harassing attempts to relitigate custody.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409 comment, 9A U.L.A. 439-40 (1998).
34.
See Hill v. Hill, 548 So.2d 705, 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
35.
C. Gail Vasterling, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act: A Statute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 923, 933 (1989).
36.
See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §409(a), 9A U.L.A. 439 (1998).
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ment of attorney's fees would deter a noncustodial parent from using the
modification hearing as a tool for punishing the former spouse.
IV. ENDANGERMENT STANDARD ADOPTED

The UMDA endangerment provision has been influential in some jurisdictions. For example, in 1971 Colorado enacted relocation provisions
that tracked the UMDA Model Act virtually verbatim. 37 Minnesota adopted
the UMDA endangerment theory in 1983 in Auge v. Auge. 38 Missouri
adopted the theory in In re Marriage of Cornish, 39 and Ohio was also an
early adopter. 40
As recently as 2003,'41 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the nonprimary residential custodian parent who objects to the primary residential
custodian's relocation with a child can only prevent relocation by being
named sole or primary residential custodian. To accomplish this, the noncustodial parent must demonstrate that the child's present environment seriously endangers his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health, and the
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by its
4 2 the Nevada Supreme Court held that a
advantages. In Hayes v. Gallacher,
noncustodial parent can overcome the presumption favoring relocation only
by showing that the custodial parent has consented to modification of custody to noncustodial parent, the child has been integrated into noncustodial
parent's family with the custodial parent's consent, or the child would be
endangered by the move.
V.

ENDANGERMENT PROCEDURES AND PRESUMPTIONS

The UMDA also suggested that a legal system adopting the endangerment standard should consider creating certain procedures; procedures
that when adopted in some jurisdictions placed many noncustodial parents

37.
See 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 520-32; In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776,
780 (Colo. 1996); West v. West, 1994 WL 284974, at 2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("Minnesota's
custody and custody modification provisions are derived from the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce act. Therefore, they have a predisposition for protecting the stability of a child's
environment."). See UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 409 comment, 9A U.L.A 43940 (1998).
334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1983).
38.
39.
780 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
40.
See Whaley v. Whaley, 399 N.E.2d 1270 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
41.
Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003).
972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999).
42.
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at a distinct disadvantage in relocation disputes. 43 These procedures increase the difficulty of applying the binuclear family-centered approach to
resolution of relocation disputes suggested in this article. For example, the
commentary to section 410 of the UMDA 44 states that:
[t]his section establishes a procedure for seeking . . . a
modification of a custody decree by motion supported with
affidavits. The procedure is designed to result in denial of
the motion without a hearing unless the court finds that the
affidavits establish adequate cause for holding a hearing.
The procedure will thus tend to discourage contests over
temporary custody and prevent repeated or insubstantial
motions for modification.4 5
States such as Arizona adopted the UMDA 46 view, and its courts applied the philosophy of the above provision to relocation disputes.47 Under
Arkansas 48 and Minnesota law, 49 a party seeking a relocation order must
submit, together with moving papers, an affidavit setting forth facts that
support the move. When considering whether to grant a relocation hearing,
these courts take the facts alleged in the affidavits as true50 and determine
the merits of the claim solely upon the affidavits without testing the credibility of the witnesses. If the noncustodial parent fails to establish a prima
facie case of endangerment, the Minnesota courts do not consider the relocation a modification of custody. Rather, they view relocation as requiring
an adjustment in visitation with the noncustodial parent. These courts
weigh the harm likely to be caused by the change of environment against
the advantage of change to the child with the burden resting on the noncustodial parent to show that the norm outweighs the advantages of the move. 51
The process followed by Minnesota, Arkansas, and other jurisdictions
makes decision-making efficient for the judicial system but leaves the actual determination of what is in the best interests of a child potentially hidden behind the mask of a lawyer's drafting skills. The primary losers are
43.
Note that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act does not require that the affidavits establish a prima facie case. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 410, 9A U.L.A.
538 (1998).
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 539.
46.
Richards v. Superior Court, 523 P.2d 117, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
See In re Marriage of Dorman, 9 P.3d 329 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
47.
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653 (Ark. 2003).
48.
MINN. STAT. § 518.185 (1980).
49.
See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 481 N.W.2d 864, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
50.
See Itasca County Soc. Servs. ex rel. Hall v. David, 379 N.W.2d 700, 703
51.
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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the child, who has never had her best interests decided in a hearing before a
neutral decision maker, and the noncustodial parent and the extended binuclear family, who receive minimal recognition.
VI. DEFINING ENDANGERMENT
The use of the endangerment requirement has injected a significant
level of uncertainty into the jurisdictions that apply it because of the difficulty courts have in giving it an appropriate meaning. Only a few of the
large number of appellate cases are necessary to illustrate this point.
For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Silbaugh v. Silbaugh,52 stated that a noncustodial parent's allegations that the custodial
parent and fiancd abused alcohol and the fact that the custodial parent's
decision to relocate in Arizona would create anxiety for the children did not
rise to the level of establishing endangerment of the children's physical or
emotional health. In the same case, the court approved the trial judge's
decision to reject a psychologist's report that was obtained to support the
noncustodial parent in the dispute.53 In Kilpela v. Kilpela, 54 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge who had failed to find endangerment in affidavits submitted by the noncustodial parent. The trial judge had
ruled no endangerment existed despite evidence that the custodial parent
had exercised poor judgment by involving himself with minors in the use of
alcohol and possibly controlled substances. In Yohn v. Yohn, 56 the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge who had failed to grant the
noncustodial parent a hearing on endangerment claims where it was alleged
that the custodial parent had abused the child by kicking him and hitting his
head against the wall on at least three occasions.
In Volz v. Peterson,57 the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a trial
judge who it said erred in refusing to find prima facie evidence of endangerment. The court concluded that there was endangerment where a daughter used drugs and cigarettes with her stepsiblings, snuck out of the home,
refused to go to her father's house for visitation, and all of the children
were having difficulties at school.58 In Mock v. Mock, 59 the North Dakota
court could not agree on whether allegations made by a husband established
a prima facie case for change of custody. The noncustodial parent had as52.
53.
54.
55.

56.
57.
58.

59.

543 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1996).
Id.
2003 WL 1908090 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
Id.

2002 WL 1803829 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
667 N.W.2d 637 (N.D. 2003).
Id.

673 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 2004).
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serted that the custodial parent failed to provide an emotionally healthy and
stable environment for the child, failed to ensure that the child ate properly
and obtained enough rest, that the child had been to the doctor over twenty
times in the last eighteen months, and that the custodial parent left the child
at the residence of a relative, whose son had been convicted on charges of
child pornography, drugs, and theft. 60 While the majority believed that
these facts indicated endangerment, the dissent strongly disagreed. 6' The
dissent argued that even if the allegations were taken as true, they only established that the custodial parent left the child with a relative for three days
and that the relative "has a son who has been convicted of child pornography, drugs, and theft., 62 There were no allegations, said the dissent, that
the relative's son was ever at the home during the three days the child was
there or that the child was ever in contact with the son at any time.63
Another area of confusion is the question of whether the moral climate
of the custodial parent's home is open to challenge as endangerment. For
example, in Higgins v. Higgins64 the Arizona court reversed a trial judge's
ruling, which had given a father custody primarily because of the custodian's alleged immoral conduct. The trial judge had ruled that the mother's
adultery and cohabitation were seriously psychologically harmful to the
children. In reversing the trial judge, the appellate court observed that a
claim that "children are being very seriously harmed by a parent's adulterous cohabitation is not one for which the answer is so generally known or
accurately and readily determined that it can be proved by judicial no,,61
tice.
VII. DEFINING THE "NEW FAMILY"
A theory about the existence of a custodial child's family, apparently
intimately linked to the philosophy of the UMDA, emerged in the 1970s.
This theory is characterized here as the "new family" theory and it was during the 1970s that courts began to openly express the view that following a
divorce and an award of custody to a primary parent, a "new family" was
created that consisted only of the custodial parent and child. This novel
theory removed the noncustodial parent from the child's "family" at a time
when the vast majority of custody awards and relocation rulings favored
women. The consequences of the application of such a theory should have
been obvious to its advocates-it suggested a gender-biased approach to
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 638.
Id. at 640 (Maring, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
981 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 139.
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custody matters and was most likely to engender suspicion and outrage
among some fathers.
The "new family" theory was led by the New Jersey court in
D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio.66 In that decision the court stated that after divorce and an award of primary custody to one of the parents, the children
belonged to a "new family" unit that consisted of the children and the primary parent.67 It declared that "what is advantageous to that unit as a
whole, to each of its members individually and to the way they relate to
each other and function together is obviously in the best interests of the
children., 68 Application of this theory further distanced the noncustodial
parents, most of whom were fathers, from their children. Although the
court recognized that the noncustodial parents' interests retained significant
importance, 69 the "new family" theory posited that a child's interests were
so intricately interwoven with the well-being of the "new family" unit that
the determination of the child's best interest required that the interests of
the custodial parent be taken into account as well.7 °
Several jurisdictions joined New Jersey in accepting and applying the
"new family" theory. For example, in Hale v. Hale,7' a Massachusetts appeals court reversed a trial court's decision to deny the custodial mother
permission to take the parties' three children to California. The court justified its reversal on the ground that "[t]he best interests of children for purposes of deciding whether to permit removal are also interwoven with the
well-being of the custodial parent, and the determination, therefore, requires
that the interests of the mother also be taken into account." 72 In Henry v.
Henry, a Michigan appellate court declared that the "test [for relocation] ...
is the best interests of the new family unit.... [a]rbitrary imposition of the
'best interests of the child' test in all matters
concerning children is illogical
' 73
worst.
at
insensitive
cruelly
and
at best

66.
365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Ascuitto v. Farricielli, 711 A.2d 708 (Conn. 1998) (recognizing importance of
familial relationship between noncustodial parent and child in context of parent-child immunity).
70.
See, e.g., Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996) (stating that
"[t]he interests of the custodial parent and the interests of the child are basically interrelated,
even if they are not always precisely the same."); Mize v. Mize, 621 So.2d 417, 419 (Fla.
1993) (discussing how "it follows" that what is good for a custodial parent's well-being is
good for a child's well-being).
71.
429 N.E.2d 340 (1981).
72.
Id. at 342.
73.
326 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
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The Wyoming Supreme Court in Love v. Love, 74 stated that the relocation "[t]est is not singly to establish the best interests of the child, but
'whether the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the
child will be improved by the removal.' 75 As recently as 2002, in Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 76 the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that a custodial parent, as a threshold matter, does not have to prove a real advantage
specific to the children to justify the move. Rather, the custodial parent
need prove only that there was a real advantage to the new family unit that
would result from the move. 77
The "new family" theory viewed the noncustodial parent as an outsider. It ignored the potential psychological impact the theory might have
on a child and the noncustodial parent. Furthermore, it provided encouragement to non-custodians, a large majority of whom were men, to suspect
the legal system's relocation laws as gender biased and politically motivated.
VIII.

DISCOVERING PARENTAL MOTIVES

It is difficult to discern a parental motive in a relocation dispute.
However, undue acceptance and application of the "new family" theory has
placed an exaggerated emphasis on the custodial parent rather than recognizing the existence of the binuclear family and child. This emphasis may
have obscured the primary purpose of the law, which is to determine the
best interests of the minor child. For example, relocation has been justified
because the custodial parent relocated in order to seek better employment,
or remarried and desired to live with a new spouse.78 Relocation has also
851 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wyo. 1993).
74.
75.
Id. (quoting Arquilla v. Arquilla, 407 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (emphasis added)).
76.
79 S.W.3d 856 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002).
77.
Id.
See, e.g., Geiger v. Yeager, 846 A.2d 691, 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (noting that
78.
the "mother now has an offer of employment from a North Carolina hospital where before
she did not even have a job prospect in the state. Further, this job would allow mother to
continue her education and better her and [her child's] quality of life."); Kryvanis v. Kruty,
733 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (noting that "[p]etitioner's proof concerning
the lower cost of living in North Carolina, her prospects for a higher paying position there
and her husband's much better employment situation all support [f]amily [c]ourt's finding of
economic necessity for the relocation."); Chen v. Heller, 759 A.2d 873, 880 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) (the best interests of the minor daughters would be better served where the
divorced wife was relocating to a foreign state to obtain employment, both children preferred
to live with her in that state, and experts for both the divorced wife and her former husband
recommended that the children be permitted to relocate on the ground that the divorced wife
would be in a better position to socialize the children through adolescence); McCrensky v.
Schweitzer, 455 N.Y.S.2d 184, 187 (N.Y. Tr. Term. 1982) (the "[former] wife and her [pre-
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been justified because of the custodial parent's health,7 9 proximity to the
custodial parent's extended family,8 ° or improved educatioial opportunities.
A custodial parent's "real" motive for relocating may have been disguised since the time of the original dissolution. For example, a custodial
parent may have intentionally withheld an intention to relocate from the
court and the noncustodial parent during earlier negotiations, leading to a
marital settlement agreement or during a custody hearing. The reason for
not providing the information was to lay a foundation for obtaining primary
custody so that a relocation request brought months later would be viewed
in a favorable light.81
The custodial parent may also have spent time and energy on psychologically undermining the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child
prior to making a relocation demand. For example, in Clark v. Clark,83
sent] husband had shown sufficient financial considerations and prospect of better employment opportunities outside of the New York area," and agreement permitted former wife to
relocate anytime after her remarriage).
79.
Hollandsworth, 109 S.W.3d 653 at 663-64.
[T]he polestar in making a relocation determination is the best interest of
the child, and the court should take into consideration the following matters: (1) the reason for the relocation; (2) the educational, health, and leisure opportunities available in the location in which the custodial parent
and children will relocate.
Id.
80.
Milea v. Paradiso, 719 N.Y.S.2d 749, 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (evidence that
a "move to [another] county would allow [mother] and the children to be in close proximity
to her extended family and permit children to be raised in a country environment" was insufficient to support her relocation request or alteration of existing joint custody arrangement).
81.
Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W.3d 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that even if
mother intentionally misled court during divorce proceeding concerning her intent to remarry and relocate, such misrepresentations were insufficient to support finding that her
proposed relocation to another state was not being made in good faith following divorce).
82.
See, e.g., C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 879 So.2d 1169, 1175 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (expert
stated that, even throughout the custody evaluation, when under extreme scrutiny, the
mother continued to act in a way that was not in the best interest of her children by continuing in "an all-out campaign to undermine, if not totally destroy, the children's relationship
with the father." The father claimed that the mother interfered with his telephone visitation
with their child and otherwise acted to undermine his relationship with the child); In re
Madeline S., 769 N.Y.S.2d 22, 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (the child's "mother had conducted
a 'relentless campaign to discourage visitation' and demonstrated an intense desire to undermine [father's] parental relationship."); Barnhart v. Coles, 680 N.Y.S.2d 23, 26 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (mother had denied father visitation, to which he was entitled under order,
for a period of over two and one-half months, and "[mother] had resorted to deceit and fabrication to undermine father's relationship"); Farien v. Farien, 2001 WL 687144 *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2001) ("[father] expressed concern that Mother said things to [child] to undermine
Father's relationship with [child]."); Feather v. Feather, 1998 WL 151393 *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1998) ("mother has willfully and intentionally attempted to undermine the father's
relationship with the children, and her conduct has substantially contributed to the deterioration of the father's relationship with the two older children."). See also, In re Marriage of
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the custodial parent had engaged in a pattern of undermining behavior, including refusing visitation for long periods of time and over holidays.
A custodial parent may also resent the noncustodial parent and the relocation decision may be a direct response to the resentment.84 He or she
may harbor the fear that the child may closely bond with the noncustodial
parent and feel that relocation will reduce the strength of the developing
relationship. The custodial parent may simply want to "get back" at the
noncustodian through false allegations,85 or seeks to make a "fresh start,
establish authority as head of the "new family unit" 86 created after the divorce, or simply demonstrate independence from the ex-spouse.
It is not clear how these justifications confer direct benefits on the minor child who is in the care of the primary parent. However, it is clear that
relocation confers benefits on the custodial parent's desire to promote that
parent's own happiness. Whether87that happiness overlaps with the custodial child's welfare is problematic.
Some courts use the geographic mobility of the United States' population as justification for allowing a custodial parent to relocate with a minor
child. 88 For example, it is commonly known that "within four years of
separation and divorce about one-fourth of mothers with custody move to a
new location. 8 9 In addition, "one in five Americans change his or her residence each year." 90 These courts do not, however, give great weight to the
economic costs associated with the change or the potential psychological
impact a child and the noncustodial parent may incur when they no longer
have regular face-to-face contact.
Steving, 980 P.2d 540 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (undermining effort not sufficient to justify
preventing relocation).
2003 WL 21259026 (Ky. 2003).
83.
See Benedict v. Benedict, 115 N.Y.S.2d 352, 364 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1952) ("[N]o
84.
matter how deeply, and understandably, petitioner may resent respondent's 'second wife,' in
so far as concerns the children it is incumbent upon her to be mindful that 'where love once
was, let there be no hate."').
David K. v. Iris K., 714 N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). "[E]vidence
85.
revealed defendant deliberately frustrated and interfered with plaintiffs visitation rights and
made false allegations of sexual misconduct." Id.
In re Marriage of Harris, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 842, 868 (Cal. 2004). "[F]inal custody
86.
order 'creates new legal relationships between the parents themselves and between each
parent and the child or children. It also creates a new family unit now commonly referred to
as a 'single parent family."" Id.
See, e.g., Gridley v. Beausoleil, 454 N.E.2d 1296, 1297 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)
87.
(The appellate court, in reversing the judgment of the trial judge, noted that "granting the
plaintiff leave to remove the minor children to Virginia 'would not promote . . . [their] happiness and welfare."').
88.
Chris Ford, Untying the Relocation Knot: Recent Developments and a Model for
Change, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (1997).
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
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Relocation is also justified on the theory that the citizens of the nation
have a modem ability to communicate over long distances. 9 1 The suggestion is that computers, technology and competitive long-distance telephone
rates have changed the way people connect with each other when they are
apart, and allow for greater interaction between the noncustodial parent and
child. 92 Phone calls and email are useful supplements to visitation, however, they are doubtful as complete replacements for regular face-to-face
contact with a biological parent.
The "real" motive of the noncustodial parent opposing relocation may
also be obscured. The noncustodian's objection to relocation may be based
on resentment and intended to interrupt the relationship between the custodian and child. 93 A noncustodial parent may also be seeking to obtain financial relief by eliminating a child support obligation. The noncustodial
parent may be angry about losing touch with a child and feel that the relocation signals that his or her parenthood is being devalued.94
The noncustodial parent and child may enjoy spending time with each
other and the noncustodial parent may believe that removing regular contact
will interfere with their companionship and the noncustodial parent's ability
to make a positive contribution to the child's development. When a child
and parent are separated so that "weekly or monthly visits [are] impractical,
[it] 'is likely to add considerably to the difficulty of maintaining such a
relationship.' ' '95 The noncustodial parent may also wish to continue to
monitor the child's upbringing on a continuing basis and play a significant
role in the child's life as the child matures.
As noted earlier, although allowing relocation may improve the custodial parent's life, it is not so clear that the relocation will necessarily improve the child's life. However, many courts continue to unduly emphasize
only the custodial parent and his or her happiness as justifying a move.

91.

Kelly M. Slavitt, Gabby in Wonderland-Through the Internet Looking Glass, 80

J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 611, 611-12 (1998).

92.
Id.
93.
B.K. v. J.K., 823 A.2d 987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
94.
Joan B. Kelly, Michael E. Lamb, Developmental Issues in Relocation Cases
Involving Young Children: When, Whether, and How?, 17 J.FAM. PSYCHOL. 193, 198

(2003).

95.
Sanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman & William V. Fabricius, Relocation of Children After Divorce and Children'sBest Interest: New Evidence and Legal Considerations,
17 J.FAM. PSYCHOL. 206, 207 (2003).

2005]

A SOLUTION TO RELOCATION CUSTODY DISPUTES

IX. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS' SEARCH FOR
SOLUTIONS

The efforts of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (the
Academy) to achieve a solution to relocation should not go unnoticed. Its
special Concerns of Children Committee undertook a study of relocation
law that was "geared towards presenting a Model Relocation Act. 96 The
Academy claims a membership from all regions of the United States of
highly experienced family law attorneys with "widely disparate views" on
family law issues.97 When drafting its relocation recommendations, the
Academy researched the literature on relocation law, considered various
state statutes, reviewed the case law from across the country, consulted with
mental health professionals, and examined research regarding the impact
that divorce and subsequent relocation had on children. It found only "limited empirical data on any of these vital subjects. ' 98
When it completed its work, the Academy observed that some of the
issues it touched upon were so controversial that its final product contained
several alternatives. The drafters could not agree, for example, on whether
relocation is a modification issue, and which of the two parties has the burden of proof in a relocation dispute. 99 It was left to the states to determine
these issues. 00 The Academy characterized its final proposal as a template
for states seeking a "solution to the relocation quandary."''
The end result
of the drafting efforts by the Academy was to leave 02the most important issues surrounding relocation without clear resolution.'
96.
Barbara Ellen Handschu, The Making of a Model Relocation Act: A Committee
Member's Perspective, 10 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 25 (1998).
97.
American Academy of MatrimonialLawyers ProposedModel Relocation Act an
Act Relating to the Relocation of the Principal Residence of a Child, 10 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 1, 2 (1998).

98.
99.
100.

Id.

Id.
Handschu, supra note 96, at 31.
Id. at 31-32. The following alternatives are available:
[Alternative A] The relocating person has the burden of proof that the
proposed relocation is made in good faith and in the best interest of the
child. [Alternative B] The non-relocating person has the burden of proof
that the objection to the proposed relocation is made in good faith and
that relocation is not in the best interest of the child. [Alternative C] The
relocating person has the burden of proof that the proposed relocation is
made in good faith. If that burden of proof is met, the burden shifts to
the non-relocating person to show that the proposed relocation is not in
the best interest of the child.

101.
Id.
102.
It should be noted, however, that the model act has influenced changes in some
jurisdictions. For example, it appears that the notice provisions found in Missouri's relocation statute, which became effective August 28, 1998, was influenced by the model act. See
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QUESTIONABLE SOCIAL SCIENCE

The available social science data regarding the impact of relocation on
a child is sparse and conflicting. There is disagreement over fundamental
questions such as whether substituting regular visitation during the summer
with regular visits on a weekly basis negatively affects a child psychologically. The uncertainty with social science evidence over the impact relocation has on a child was apparent when the UMDA was being considered in
the early 1970s. For example, Professor David Chambers, writing in the
Michigan Law Review, 0 3 made the following observation:
In 1969, Phoebe Ellsworth and Robert Levy, in the course
of the development of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, reviewed at length the available research on divorced
families and on children living in other than two-parent settings to "determine what was empirically known about the
effects of various custodial awards and arrangements on the
child's development." They were disappointed. They did
not find studies comparing children in different custodial
settings after divorce. In fact, they could not find any studies of children with fathers after divorce or any studies of
children living after divorce with mothers who had not
been primary caretakers before divorce.1°4
In a 1985 05
article, Professor Joan G. Wexler made essentially the same observation.1
Others have been critical of the use of social science to assist in a relocation decision. For example, Professor Martha L. Fineman and family
therapist Anne Opie, in a 1987 article, suggested that "these legal uses of
social science literature, designated as objective, neutral, and scientific uses
of objective, neutral, and scientific facts, may 'in fact' be inherently political and/or ideological statements, which are 10shielded
and obscured by the
6
scientific mantle in which they are wrapped."'
As observed earlier in this article, a committee of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers was developing a model relocation act in
1988 and searched for empirical social science data to assist with its proJill S. Kingsbury, "Mommy, Are We Moving? No... Maybe... Yes .... -The Evolution of
Missouri'sRelocation Law, 60 J. Mo. B. 83, 85 (Mar.-Apr. 2004).
103.
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984).
104.
Id. at 504.
105.
Wexler, supra note 31, at 784.
106.
Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinationsat Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 107, 110 (1987).
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posal. It consulted with mental health professionals and reviewed the existing research regarding the effect of divorce and subsequent relocation on
reported finding only limited empirical data on
children. 7 The committee
18
0
subjects.
vital
these
all of
One of the influential social scientists in this area since the 1970s has
been Dr. Judith S. Wallerstein.10 9 Her research is seen as instrumental in
developing the "new family" view adopted by several jurisdictions. She
claims that her studies support the view that the custody of a child should
not be changed absent a showing that the child is in danger." 10 She also
claims that the cumulative body of social science research fails to support
the view that frequent and continuing access to both parents lies at the core
of the child's best interest."l ' Finally, she contends that "[w]hen courts
intervene in ways that disrupt the child's relationship with the custodial
psychological harm may occur to the child as well as to the
parent, serious
12
parent."'
107.

American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers ProposedModel Relocation Act an

Act Relating to the Relocation of the Principal Residence of a Child, 10 J.AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 1,2 (1998).
Id.
108.
Judith S. Wallerstein, Ph.D., founded the Center for the Family in Transition in
109.
Marin County, California, in 1980 and served as its executive director from 1980 until 1993.
She has researched and written extensively on the impact of divorce on children. See, e.g.,
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY,

SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (setting

forth Dr. Wallerstein's theories); Joan B. Kelly & Judith S. Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 20
(1976); Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The
Adolescent Experience, in 3 The Child in His Family: Children at Psychiatric Risk, 479
(1974); Judith S. Wallerstein & Joan B. Kelly, The Effects of ParentalDivorce: Experiences
of the Child in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 256 (1976); Judith S. Wallerstein &
Joan B. Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Preschool Child, 14 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCH. 600 (1975); Judith S. Wallerstein, The Long Term Effects of Divorce on Children:A Review, 30 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCH. 349 (1991).

Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 10, at 310, 318.
110.
Id. at 311. It is also claimed that there is an increased emotional dependence on
111.
the custodial parent after divorce and that children of all ages "were in trouble" when the
home parent-child relationship was affected by stress on the home-parent, such as "loneliness and discouragement." JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP 114, 224-225 (1980). See also FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J.
CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 72 (1991)

(noting no connection between frequency of noncustodial visits and good outcomes for the
child).
Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 10, at 310, 318. See Marsha Kline et al., Chil112.
dren's Adjustment in Joint and Sole Custody Families, 25 DEVELOP. PSYCHOL. 430, 431

(1989) (noting that research indicates that factor associated with good outcomes for children
in post-divorce families includes a close, sensitive relationship with a psychologically intact
custodial parent).
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Dr. Wallenstein's research, however, has been challenged. For example, in an article published in 2000, Dr. Richard A. Warshak wrote that
"critical reading of over seventy-five studies in the social science literature,
including Wallerstein's earlier reports, generally supports a policy of en13
couraging both parents to remain in close proximity to their children."
Dr. Warshak asserts that Professor Wallenstein ignored a "broad consensus
of professional opinion, based on a large body of evidence, that children
normally develop close attachments to both parents, and that they do best
when they have the opportunity to establish and maintain such attachments."''1 4 He claims that in early research conducted by Dr. Wallerstein,
she recognized that a child's need for continuity of emotional bonds meant
the need for continuity of relations with both parents." 5 Warshak is skeptical of Dr. Wallerstein's research because she now interprets "the same research results as supporting the view that courts should foster continuity in
the child's relationship with the mother but not with the father [where] the
scientific literature does not justify it.' 1 6 He also questions Dr. Wallerstein's continued reliance on old research, conducted at a time when children saw relatively little of their fathers after divorce, where "recent studies
document a change since the 1970s and early 1980s with greater involvement of divorced fathers with their children.""' 7
Dr. Warshak claims that Dr. Wallerstein excluded from her research
"many studies which repeatedly demonstrate a link between frequency of
children's contact with divorced fathers and children's behavior, emotional
health, satisfaction with custodial arrangements, and academic achievement." '"18 He also criticizes her assumption that the relocation will be rewarding for the relocating parent, suggesting that courts should consider the
very real possibility that the relocation may not bring the anticipated benefits.' 19
Another skeptic is the Honorable Thomas A. James, Jr. He authored
an article that challenged judicial reliance on social science research used in
making relocation decisions. 20 Judge James wrote that:
113.

Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children's Best Interests in Relocation

Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (2000). Dr. Warshak is a clinical, consulting,

and research psychologist in private practice and Clinical Professor at the University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas, Texas.
114.
Id.at 85 n.9 (citing RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION (1992)).
115.
Id.at 85.
116.
Id.at 86.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at90.

119.

120.

Id. at99.

Judge Thomas A. James, Jr., Custody Relocation Law in Pennsylvania: Time to

Revisit, 107 DICK. L. REV.45 (Summer 2002).
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This paper will review the social science research and opinion applicable to custody relocation law, and demonstrate
that Gruber [Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super.
1990)] relied on limited research and possibly flawed social
science in reaching its conclusion that the main focus in a
custody relocation case should be to inextricably link the
best interest of children to the best interest of the custodial
parent. 121
hard social
Judge James joined others who have asserted that there is little
122
area.
this
in
guidance
with
courts
provide
to
science research
When the American Law Institute (ALI) considered the relocation issue, it recognized the disagreement among the social scientists on the relative importance of custodial stability versus active involvement of both
parents.1 23 However, it apparently adhered to the 1960s-70s view inter alia
that following divorce there was a new family consisting of the child and
the custodial parent.
Joan Kelly and Michael Lamb claim that there was "no empirical research on the effects of relocation on very young children" before they undertook their study, which was first published in 2003.124 They assert that
[w]hile young children are less likely to be at risk when
their relocating parents have psychological strengths and
rear their children competently-showing warmth, sensitivity and using authoritative discipline-the loss of important
attachment relationships remains a central risk factor when
and have been innonresidential parents are competent
125
volved with their young children.
Stanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman, and William V. Fabricius claim
126
that their recent study provides the "first direct evidence on relocation."'
Most importantly, they assert that "on most child127outcomes, the ones whose
parents moved are significantly disadvantaged."'
121.
Id. at 45.
122.
Id. at 53.
Janet Leach Richards, Resolving Relocation Issues Pursuant to the ALl Family
123.
Dissolution Principles: Are Children Better Protected?, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1105, 1111
(2001).
Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Developmental Issues in Relocation Cases
124.
Involving Young Children: When, Whether, and How? 17 J. FAm. PSYCHOL. 193, 193
(2003).
125.
Id. at 197-98.
126.
See Braver, Ellman, & Fabricius, supra note 95, at 206.
Id.
127.
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In summary, it is clear that present social science research cannot be
relied upon to confirm application of principles that adhere to the 1970s
view that what is good for the custodial parent is also good for the child.
Courts and legislatures should carefully analyze all social science in this
area along with the recent decisions from Georgia and California. There is
sparse support for believing that a direct link exists between the happiness
of the custodial parent and that of the minor child.
XI. TRENDS

It has been suggested that a relocation trend exists in state court decisions, which began in 1996 with the California Supreme Court's ruling in

In re the Marriage of Burgess,'28 that more liberally allows the custodial or
primary parent to relocate. 29 Courts from Rhode Island, New Jersey, and
Arkansas have joined in this view 130 and justify their conclusions in part on
acceptance of the "new family" theory.
The "trend," if there is one, appears to have been erroneously built
around two factors. First, an amica curia brief written by Dr. Judith S.
Wallenstein that the New Jersey Court in Baures v. Lewis,'3 "interpreted as
supporting the conclusion that 'in general, what is good for the custodial
parent is good for the child."",132 The second factor impacting the trend is a
general reliance on developments in relocation law in California. For example, when the Arkansas Supreme Court issued a decision favoring custodial parents involved in relocation disputes in 2002, it used New Jersey and
California decisions to assist it when arriving at its conclusion. 33 The

128.

913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1966).

129. See Braver, Ellman, & Fabricius, supra note 95, at 207; Kelly & Lamb, supra
note 124, at 196.
130. See also In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1996) (creating the
presumption that the custodial parent's choice to move his or her children should generally
be allowed); Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. App. 1992) (holding that
custodial relocation is not in itself a change in circumstances justifying altering custody);
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 214 (Minn. 1988) (holding that the noncustodial parent
has the burden of showing that the move will endanger the child or is meant to frustrate the
noncustodial parent's relationship with child); Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn.
1983) (holding that the custodial parent is presumptively entitled to relocate); Fortin v.
Fortin, 500 N.W.2d 229, 233 (S.D.1993) (interpreting the state statute as incorporating a
presumption for removal); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993) (creating a
strong presumption in favor of the custodial parent); Long v. Long, 381 N.W.2d 350, 352
(1986) (holding that removal is permitted if the custodial parent has good reason for moving).
131.
770 A.2d 214, 225 (N.J. 2001).
132.
Braver, Ellman, & Fabricius, supra note 95.
133.
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 109 S.W.3d 653, 663 (Ark. 2003).
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decision,
Rhode Island Supreme Court, when issuing a similar relocation
34
also relied on developments in New Jersey and California.'
As detailed later in this article, the social science used by these courts
fails to provide strong support to the proposition for which they were applying it; i.e., relocation. Furthermore, to the extent they relied upon Califordecinia decisions, that law has been seriously put in doubt by the recent
135
Lamusga.
of
Marriage
re
In
in
Court
Supreme
sion of the California
In In re Marriage of Lamusga, the mother had primary physical custody of two children and filed a motion to modify the non-custodial father's
visitation order to permit her to relocate with the children to Ohio. The trial
judge ruled that the father would gain physical custody of the children, at
least during the school year, if the mother relocated. The ruling was unexpected because, prior to In re Marriage of LaMusga, several intermediate
appellate courts had concluded that the damage to the child resulting from
the changed circumstances justifythe relocation could not itself constitute
36
ing a reexamination of custody.'
The custodial parent appealed, expecting, no doubt, to have the trial
judge reversed because the California Supreme Court had previously held
that a custodial parent possessed a presumptive right to relocate and retain
custody, unless the noncustodial parent could show that the move would be
detrimental to the children.137 However, the court surprised many when it
held that if the proposed relocation would cause detriment to the children,
"the court must perform the delicate and difficult task of determining
whether a change in custody is in the best interests of the children." 138 The
court observed that "just as a custodial parent does not have to establish that
a planned move is 'necessary,' neither does the noncustodial parent have to
establish that a change of custody is 'essential' to prevent detriment to the
children from the planned move."'139 The decision suggested that a trial
court's role is not limited to merely determining whether the proposed relocation is based on a bad faith desire to frustrate the other parent's relationship. Rather, the court must decide if the move is detrimental to the child,
and, 14if0 so, whether in light of all the circumstances a custody shift is justified.
Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 249 (R.I. 2004).
134.
88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004).
135.
136.
See In re Marriage of Abrams 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 21 (2003); In re Marriageof
Lasich, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 363 (2002); In re Marriage of Edlund & Hales, 78 Cal. Rptr.
2d 671,681 (1999).
In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d at 473.
137.
In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d at 85.
138.
Id. at 84.
139.
Among the factors to be considered, the supreme court listed the following:
140.
the children's interest in stability and continuity in the custodial arrangement; the distance of the move; the age of the children; the chil-
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In re Marriage of LaMusga generated controversy among California
family law attorneys about whose interests prevail and what presumptions
can be made in relocation disputes.' 4 ' From their perspectives, it is unclear
whether In re Marriage of LaMusga overturns a bright-line standard allegedly established in In re Marriage of Burgess142 or merely clarifies this
decision.
In conclusion, those courts that have joined a "trend" toward allowing
greater relocation, have done so by relying upon highly questionable, if not
erroneous, social science data. Furthermore, to the extent that each court
relied on each other and California law, the recent decision in In Re Marriage of LaMusga places any reliance on California law on a shaky foundation.
XII. THE

BINUCLEAR

FAMILY

As already observed, the "new family" theory is a product of 1960s
and 1970s thinking, and it posits as its thesis that custodial parents should
be allowed to relocate with their child in good faith to pursue "their best
opportunities."'' 43 Supporters have claimed that social science research regarding relocation fails to support the conclusion that frequent and continuing access to both parents is in the child's best interests; therefore, a parent
with primary physical custody generally should be able to relocate with the
child. 144 However, research suggests that children are better off if they have
frequent contact and good relationships with both parents. 45 Research also

dren's relationship with both parents; the relationship between the parents including, but not limited to, their ability to communicate and cooperate effectively and their willingness to put the interests of the children
above their individual interests; the wishes of the children if they are mature enough for such an inquiry to be appropriate; the reasons for the
proposed move; and the extent to which the parents currently are sharing
custody.
Id. at 100.

141.
Sara Hoffman Jurand, California Ruling On Move-Away Cases Splits Family
Advocates, 40-JUL Trial 103 (July 2004).

142.
143.
144.
145.

In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d at 473.
Bowermaster, supra note 10.
Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 10, at 311, 318.
See Marion Gindes, Ph.D., The PsychologicalEffects of Relocationfor Children

of Divorce, 10 J.AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 119, 132 (1998); Joan B. Kelley & Michael E.
Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Deci-

sions for Young Children, 38 FAM.& CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 297, 309 (2000) (stating that
regardless of who is the primary caretaker, a child benefits from extensive contact with both
parents).
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suggests that any move, even a relatively short one, is a stressful event for a
child, and can have a negative impact on the child's well-being. 146
There is increasing suspicion that the genesis of the "new family" theory, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, may have had more to do with
gender politics than with reliable social science data. During that period, it
was reasonable to assume that mothers who received custody of the minor
children were their primary caretakers with fathers playing lesser roles in
their children's lives. At the time, fathers were employed in far greater
numbers in traditional occupations outside the home than were mothers.
Mothers were also much less likely to have the same educational and/or
employment opportunities enjoyed by fathers.
Today, however, the roles of mother and fathers have changed. While
mothers still may not have the identical job opportunities open to them as
do fathers, their prospects have dramatically improved. For example, in
1971, women earned 14.3% of the research doctorates that U.S. universities
granted, while today they earn 44.4% of them. 147 In terms of professional
doctoral degrees, today women earn 47.3% of the law degrees and 43.3% of
the medical degrees granted. 148 By comparison, women in 1970 earned
5.4% of the law degrees and 8.4% of the medical degrees. 149
Women's labor force participation rates, as a percentage of all women,
hovered between 20.0% and 30.0% from 1900 through 1950, but rose to
37.7% in 1960, 43.3% in 1970, 51.5% in 1980, 57.5% in 1990, and 60.0%
in 1999.150
The historical role of a father in the life of his child has repeatedly
changed over the past 200 years.' 5' For example, during the colonial period, fathers were viewed as the primary parent with ultimate authority over
a child. If there were a divorce, which was rare, the law awarded custody to
146.
See David Wood et al., Impact of Family Relocation on Children's Growth,
Development, School Function, and Behavior, 270 JAMA 1334, 1337 (1993) (stating that

"[a] family move disrupts the routines, relationships, and attachments that define the child's
world.").
147.
Carlo A. Pedrioli, A New Image in The Looking Glass: Faculty Mentoring,
Invitational Rhetoric, and The Second-Class Status of Women in U.S. Academia, 15
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 188 (Summer 2004) (noting that women still hold academic
positions in lower percentages than they hold professional and research doctorates).
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Robert S. Smith, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY, at inside back cover tbl. 6.1 (8th ed. 2003), citing in note 1, Scott Moss,
Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference With Disturbing Implications
for both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
I (Spring 2004).
151.
Fathers' Involvement in Their Children's Schools, National Center for Education Statistics, available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/fathers/intro.asp#role (last visited
November 20, 2004.)
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the father. The father was viewed as the moral overseer, disciplinarian,
companion, and teacher. Although mothers were responsible for the dayto-day care of young children, they were viewed as too emotional and indulgent to properly raise children.'52
In the 19th century, a father's role was redefined with the advent of
urbanization and industrialization. A father's role became that of the provider, and the role of mother was that of having primary responsibility for
children, including their moral development.
Recent societal shifts are once again transforming the roles of fathers
and mothers. Forces that are altering these roles include the increasing participation of mothers within the labor force, including mothers with young
children, and the high levels of divorce and nonmarital child bearing. The
large number of mothers in the labor force has contributed to a marked decline in the strict gender division of labor within a family to an arrangement
where the roles of mothers and fathers significantly overlap. 153
Today, fathers, like mothers, have multiple roles: as provider, protector, nurturer, companion, disciplinarian, teacher, and instiller of societal
norms.154 The term "co-parents" is increasingly used to describe the situation where
mothers and fathers are equally responsible for maintaining a
155
family.
Census Bureau data supports the view that profound changes are occurring in this society; changes that without doubt impact minor children.
For example, a 2003 Census Bureau report detailing 2002 data found that
children under fifteen years of age represented eighty-four percent of the
49.7 million children under eighteen living with two parents. Of these, only
eleven million lived with56 "stay-at-home" mothers while 189,000 lived with
"stay-at-home" fathers.
This data also found that 19.8 million children under age eighteen
were living with one parent and that of this number, 16.5 million lived with
their mother while 3.3 million lived with their father. An estimated thirty
percent lived with a single father who resided in a household that included
the father's unmarried partner. 157 Ten percent of the children lived
58 with a
single mother who was sharing a home with an unmarried partner.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
About 7-in-JO Children Live With Their Parents, U.S. Census Bureau News,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. June 12, 2003, available at
http:/lwww.census.govlPress-Release/www/releases/archives/children/001125.html
(last visited October 20, 2004).
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
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The same 2003 report found that 5.6 million children under eighteen,
or eight percent of all children, lived in a household that included a grandparent of the majority of children who lived with a grandparent, 3.7 million
lived in the grandparent's home. Of these, two-thirds had a parent pre, 159
sent."
In July 2004, the Census Bureau reported that unmarried-partner
households in 2000 consisted of 4.9 million opposite-sex partners and about
600,000 partners of the same sex. This is up from 3.2 million in 1990.' 60
Forty-three percent of opposite-sex, unmarried partner households included
children. 161 In 2002 the Bureau reported that thirty-three percent of all
62
births were to unmarried women. 1
This data reflects the enormous changes in the concept of a "family" in
the United States and demonstrates, among other matters, that a growing
number of men are taking on more typical parenting responsibilities. The
implications of these changes challenge implicit assumptions underlying the
creation of custody relocation standards in the 1960s and 1970s.
At least one jurisdiction, Georgia, has recently rejected the 1960-70s
view of the "new family" when determining relocation disputes. In Bodne
v. Bodne, 163 the Georgia Supreme Court overruled cases in that state that
had formerly applied the "new family" concept. In Bodne, the ex-husband
had received primary physical custody of the minor children when he and
his wife divorced. When he later petitioned the court seeking to modify her
visitation schedule to accommodate his upcoming move to a neighboring
state, his ex-wife challenged his relocation decision. He argued that his
reasons for leaving Georgia were to establish a new medical practice and
were grounded in a desire to enhance his economic opportunity. 64 He also
indicated that he wanted to leave behind the pre-divorce chapter of his
165
life.
The Georgia Supreme Court observed that
Dr. Bodne's decision to move out of state seriously affected an important aspect of the parties' divorce agreement, namely, that Ms. Bodne continue her equal involvement in the children's lives, and had a direct negative effect
159.
Id.
160.
Facts for Features, U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau, July 19, 2004, available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-release/www/releases/archives/
factsforfeatures-special editions/ 002265.html (last visited November 10, 2004).
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003).
164.
Id. at 729.
165.
Id.
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on the children as testified to by numerous witnesses, inthe children's pediatrician, minister, and family
cluding 166
friends.
It then overruled prior Georgia cases that had presumed that the custodial parent had a prima facie right to retain custody unless the objecting
parent shows that the environment of the proposed relocation endangers a
167 It concluded that when
child's physical, mental or emotional well-being.
a trial court makes a relocation determination based on the best interests of
the children standard, it should consider the myriad factors that have an
impact on the children, as established by the evidence produced by the parties. 168
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sears compared the "new family" theory with the "binuclear" family. He wrote:
The upshot of the dissent's focus on the 'new family unit'
headed by the custodial parent would be to make the noncustodial parent (most often the father) an outsider and to
place the custodial parent's interests above those of the
child. Moreover, this 'new-family-unit' approach ignores
the fact that a divorce creates a larger, interconnected 'binuclear family,' consisting of one household headed by the
noncustodial parent and another household headed by the
of both. 169
custodial parent, with the-child being a part
I believe that a child's family, though altered by divorce,
has the potential to coalesce and meld into a viable 'binuclear family' and to act together to further the best interests
of the child. To facilitate this possibility, the paramount issue in relocation disputes should be whether the relocation
is or is not in the best interests of the child. In this complex
equation, a child's relationship with the noncustodial parent; his ties to local schools and friends; the child's age; the
stress and instability of relocation and the corresponding
benefits of consistency and stability for the child; the interests of the entire binuclear family; the custodial parent's
reason for relocating; the dynamics of the custodial par166.

Id.

168.
169.

588 S.E.2d 728 (Ga. 2003).
Id. at 730.

167.

Id.
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ent's new family unit; and any other relevant factors may
70
be taken into consideration. 1
During the last four decades, social, economic, and political opportunities for mothers have changed significantly and the role of a father in raising children has likewise been altered. These changes support rejecting the
continued application of the "new family" theory and replacing it with the
"binuclear family" approach.
XIII.

STAGE ONE: PARENTING PLAN

There are at many reasons for suggesting the use of a parenting plan as
the first stage in a relocation dispute. First, as has already been demonstrated, there is uncertain, conflicting social science data regarding the impact separation of the child from the noncustodial parent has on the child.
Second, social changes in America no longer support the implicit assumptions associated with the "new family" theory advanced in the 1970s.
Third, varying and shifting presumptions and burdens of proof among jurisdictions has injected uncertainty in the law, which makes the outcome of
a relocation dispute unpredictable. Fourth, parenting plans provide an opportunity for the binuclear family to intimately plan for a child's future.
Fifth, parenting plans may reduce and possibly diffuse the tensions associated with many relocation disputes.17 1 By reducing the likelihood of conflict and litigation, they may protect the child from substantial psychological harm brought on by a prolonged court battle between the parents. 7 2
Sixth, many jurisdictions are already familiar with parenting plans because
they are used upon divorce and when children are born out of wedlock.
Seventh, intimately involving the biological parents in the relocation decision is more likely to be perceived as fair by both parties. Eighth, parenting
plans place the responsibility for a child's future in the hands of the individuals who possess the greatest amount of knowledge about that child.
This should result in a better resolution because it removes the decision
making from a judge, who is a distant third party. 173 Ninth, rather than
clogging the legal system with needless litigation, if properly managed,
parenting plans should reduce the number of relocation cases actually liti-

170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
See Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High Conflict
Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 506-07 (2001).

173.
See Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach To Parental
Custody Agreements, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 618 (2004).
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gated. Finally, a parenting plan "best respects174parents' fundamental right to
make parenting decisions for their children."'
Parenting plans are written agreements between parents that detail parenting time, decision making, and the children's residential arrangements. 175 They are intended to act as a formulation of parental agreement
1 76
A relocation parenting plan should
regarding the future of their children.
of the
map out a child's life in terms of responsibilities and expectations
177
custody."'
"wins
who
on
be
not
should
binuclear family; its focus
Parenting plans are based on the philosophy that the best interest of a
child is to encourage its parents to have maximum involvement with the
child. They do this by providing for advance planning and specificity. It is
thought that the "need for greater specificity comes from the increasing
complexity of family life, with most parents likely to be working, children
involved in a greater number of after-school activities, and higher expectalife." 178
tions for family, social, and intellectual
About half of the states already provide for parenting plans with a
handful requiring them in every case; others encourage parenting plans
when joint custody is ordered; a few allow parenting plans to be created at
the discretion of the parents. 179 Most states continue to follow the rule that
a parenting plan concerning custody at divorce is not enforceable until the
court examines the plan and determines that it serves the child's best interthat parents can be
ests. In general, it is thought that "the trend is to assume
' 80
children."'
their
for
decisions
wise
make
to
trusted
Relocation parenting plans should include the specific reasons why the
relocation of the child is in the child's best interests, and a judge should
review the plan to determine if the reasons protect the best interest of the
child.' 8' Once persuaded that the move is in a child's best interests, the
court should enter an order consistent with the parenting plan.
Prior agreements between the parties should not bar consideration of a
new relocation parenting plan. Experience suggests that it is difficult, if not
174.

Id.

James W. Bozzomo, Note, Joint Legal Custody: A Parent'sConstitutionalRight
175.
in a Reorganized Family, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 547, 581 (Winter 2002).

Trish Oleksa Haas, Comment, Child Custody Determinations in Michigan: Not
176.
in the Best Interests of Children or Parents, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 333, 347 (Spring
2004).
Id.
177.
Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl
178.
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 5, 8 (2002).
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impossible, for parties to foresee the future with great accuracy as changes
occur in one's life. Consequently, jurisdictions should not use prior marital
termination agreements, custody decisions, or existing parenting plans as a
shield against reexamining the situation when one of the parents is relocating.
XIV.

STAGE

Two: MANDATORY MEDIATION

This article proposes that a mandated mediation session is the second
stage of a parent-focused effort to settle a relocation dispute. It has as its
goal getting the parties to focus solely on relocation with a neutral third
party present to guide them. Mediation is accomplished in private without
the presence of outsiders or others who have no interest in the dispute,1 82
and provides the parents with a second opportunity to resolve the relocation
issue with the assistance of a professional family law mediator.
Mediation is an ancient dispute resolution technique.183 It was used
rarely in the traditional practice of law in the United States until the latter
part of the twentieth century. Mediation has developed, at least in part, in
response to general dissatisfaction with the traditional legal system.1 84 Mediation is a process whereby a neutral third person assists parties to resolve
their dispute in a way that is acceptable to everyone. As a neutral party, the
mediator, unlike a judge or arbitrator, does not evaluate the case but simply
facilitates discussions between the parties in an effort to reach a mutually
85
agreeable solution. 1
Mediation was selected for use at the second stage of resolving a relocation dispute because of its many advantages. For example, most agree
that the biological parents, rather than the judge or the parents' lawyers, are
in an excellent position to know what is best for the child. Consequently,
parents who participate in mediation should be able to work toward an
agreement that best meets the interests of the child.1 86 Mediation also possesses the potential for reducing conflict between the parents and may help
them communicate more effectively during the resolution process.1 87 It is
also thought that children of mediated disputes adjust better after the di182.
See Isaacson v. Isaacson, 792 A.2d 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (mediation is particularly appropriate and is mandated in custody cases).
183.
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vorce.188 Mediation saves time and money because it can resolve the dispute more quickly than litigation and is quite successful. 189 In a long-term
study that compared couples assigned randomly to mediation and litigation,
mediating nonresidential parents maintained more contact with their children than those who litigated.19°
Mediation is criticized by some on the theory that it is disadvantageous
191 It
for women and should not be used when domestic abuse has occurred.
is also argued that disparities in education and income may alter the ability
of women to effectively mediate as well as men. It is argued that this is
particularly the case where attorneys are not present to "'equalize' the negotiating power." 192 Mediation is sometimes criticized as a narrow family
dynamic-"one modeled after a white, middle-class family structure," with
a design that ignores family dynamics and values inherent in other ethnic
and financial categories. 193 Despite its critics, however, mediation continues to expand as a tool to resolve family disputes and its positive value in a
relocation dispute far outweighs the critics' concerns.
Another reason for selecting mediation to resolve a relocation dispute
is the familiarity many states have with its use. California was the first
state to mandate mediation in all contested custody cases. 194 Several states
have followed California's lead. 195 In Carter v. Carter,196 the West Virginia Supreme Court reviewed the use and impact of mediation nationwide.
It found that mediation can reduce the initial level of conflict between parents, which in turn can reduce long-term conflict. The court encouraged
increased use of mediation and suggested that mediation might even be
Id.
188.
189. Id.
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190. Robert E. Emery, et. al.,
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successful when traditional remedies, such as contempt proceedings, have
failed to resolve disputes.
The Missouri Court of Appeals found that mediation reduced the friction inherent in most custody arrangements and is necessary for successful
"shared parenting" in joint custody situations. 97 Similarly, the
Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that a mediation order requiring the parties to attempt
to voluntarily resolve their dispute with the aid of a social worker was consistent with Wisconsin law. 9 8 Wisconsin now requires mediation as the
first available remedy when physical custody of a child is disputed.
In conclusion, it is clear that mediation, despite some drawbacks, offers the best opportunity for warring parents to resolve a relocation issue
after their efforts to create a parenting plan have failed. It provides the parents with a second chance to settle the dispute short of a de novo hearing,
which will be costly for the parents and time consuming for the court.
XV. STAGE THREE: DE NOVO HEARING

The final stage in the process urged in this article to resolve relocation
disputes is a de novo hearing, which occurs only after the first two stages
have failed. There are several reasons for selecting a de novo hearing. For
example, it is thought that the question of relocation is better resolved with
a full airing of all the relevant facts of each case, rather than by rigid application of presumptions and standards.199 De novo review allows a court to
consider the full range of evidence relating to the child, rather than resting a
decision on language provided in affidavits. It permits a court to engage in
fact finding and independently evaluate the wisdom of relocating the child.
It is thought that a child's parents, having twice failed to resolve the
relocation issue, may be so conflicted that they are unable to place the best
interests of their child ahead of their own. A de novo hearing is most likely
to resolve this concern. A de novo hearing may also improve the negative
perception parties may hold about a court proceeding because the elimination of presumptions and burdens sends a general message of fairness to the
parties.
The de novo proceeding also gives a court added tools to resolve the
relocation dispute. For example, a court may consider appointing a guardian ad litem for the child. 2° Or, the court may appoint an attorney to repre197.
198.
199.
200.
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sent the child's individual interests in addition to the guardian ad litem with
the cost shared by the biological parents. Other experts may also be called
upon to provide insight into the dispute, including social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists. All parties may be ordered to undergo psychiatric examinations and/or a battery of psychological tests.
The use of a de novo hearing is not without difficulty. For example, in
some contexts, its mere existence may render the first two stages of the
process meaningless because it may be viewed as encouraging noncooperation in the first two stages of the resolution process. The result could be
that both parties refuse to effectively engage in early mutual decision making regarding their child. It may also be viewed by one of the parties as a
reward where the only goal was to frustrate and/or harass the custodial parent.
As with any legal proceeding, the economic situation of the parties is
also a consideration. Consequently, the costs associated with de novo review may provide the "monied" partner with an economic power advantage. A de novo proceeding is also not very efficient and may consume
large amounts of time on the calendar of a busy family court. One may
question why a court should go through this process subsequent to an earlier ruling making one of the parties the primary or sole custodial parent.
Although not a perfect solution to relocation disputes, it offers significant advantages over the present approach and holds out the greatest potential for resolving a relocation decision that will protect the best interests of a
child. Given the future of a child or children when balanced against the
court calendar and the somewhat clumsy nature of a de novo proceeding,
the balance tips easily in favor of the child and a de novo hearing.
XVI.

CONCLUSION

The legal system in the United States has failed in its effort to create a
mechanism that can resolve relocation disputes in a manner that is perceived as fair by all parties. It continues to adhere to principles, presumptions, and theories that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, and are no longer
sustainable. These old theories engender a winner-take-all mentality among
parents and are based on suspect social science relocation research.
This article argues for replacing the 1960-70 "new family" view with
the "binuclear family-centered" approach. The binuclear family more accurately reflects the present state of the "family" in America and places the
future of a child with those most interested and knowledgeable about what
is in the families' best interests. The process will also help remove suspicion that the "new family" concept was gender based and politically motivated.
This article also argues for a three staged process to resolve relocation
proceedings. The process is intended to involve the parents intimately in
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the resolution of the relocation issue, which will reduce animosity and be
more readily perceived as fair to everyone. Stage one is a mandated parenting plan meeting between the biological parents. Only if they certify
that they have failed to create a parenting plan do they move to stage two.
In stage two, they are mandated to engage in mediation. Only after these
two efforts have failed is the matter certified to the court for a de novo proceeding.
A court at stage three may call upon a battery of experts to help it resolve the relocation issue and may require that the child be appointed a
guardian ad litem and possibly a lawyer, with the parties sharing the expenses. In addition, the court may order that both parties undergo a battery
of psychological and other tests with the parties again sharing the expenses.
This article has also pointedly challenged the social science research
used by many courts to justify relocation. This is a major concern. Research indicates that active and appropriate parenting by the primary or
custodial parent and the non-moving parent typically enhances the longterm well being of a child. 20 1 Furthermore, children thrive when they are
able to maintain relationships with both parents and the parents are able to
actively and consistently parent them. 20 2 The absence of the non-moving
parent from a child's life carries the risk that prolonged parenting by a virtual stranger, while separated from a familiar parent, will reduce the value
of the contact with the parent.20 3 The distance between the homes of the
biological parents may "dramatically affect the maintenance of infantparent attachment relationships. '2 °4 Great distance between homes also
makes it economically difficult for both parents, and acts as a barrier toward sustaining a relationship with a young child.20 5
Courts that have adopted the "new family" theory have done so without a single empirical social science study containing direct data on the
psychological impact a move has on the well-being of a child.20 6 The first
direct evidence of this issue regarding relocation found that children whose
parent moved are "significantly disadvantaged., 20 7 This study suggested
that courts should give "greater weight to the child's separate interests"
when deciding a relocation dispute.20 8
Overall, this article argues for a judicial system that expends considerable time and resources on behalf of America's children. It argues for plac201.
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ing a child ahead of either parent, and the development of a binuclearfamily centered approach that recognizes the child as a member of two
separate, extended families. It challenges existing standards and procedures
which, at best, are built upon houses of sand.

